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Abstract
How do political leader’s words and actions affect people’s behavior? We address this
question in the context of Brazil by combining electoral data and geo-localized mobile
phone data for more than 60 million devices throughout the entire country. We find that
after Brazil’s president publicly and emphatically dismisses the risks associated with the
COVID-19 Pandemic and advises against isolation, social distancing measures of citizens
in pro-government localities reduce relative to those places in which his support is weaker,
while pre-event effects are insignificant. The impact is large and robust to different
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I Introduction
Leadership is a powerful tool to influence human behavior. From Plato to the modern literature
in economics (e.g. Hermalin, 1998), sociology of organizations (e.g. Weber, 1947) and management
(e.g. Burns, 1978), there is a widespread consensus that leadership matters. Leaders can have
an effective role in affecting people’s beliefs and behavior by different channels: by reducing
information asymmetries and thus reducing coordination problems (e.g. Dewan and Myatt,
2008), by setting a social norm (e.g. Acemoglu and Jackson, 2015) or, simply, by transmitting
a message symbolically and emotionally (e.g. Hermalin, 2017; Antonakis et al., 2014).
A growing empirical literature (in the field or in the lab) has recently shown that leaders
have the power – with their actions and with their words – of persuading people in a variety
of relevant contexts, such as behaving more or less honestly (e.g. Ajzenman, 2018; d’Adda
et al., 2017), increasing their contributions to public goods (e.g. Gu¨th et al., 2007; Andreoni,
2006); and increasing their productivity at work (e.g. Brandts and Cooper, 2007). A crucial
yet virtually unexplored domain in which leaders may potentially have a relevant impact is in
health-related risky behavior. Information on recommended prevention practices is typically
asymmetrical between governments and citizens, and the problem becomes even more stringent
during a public health emergency, such as a pandemic. Not only regular citizens may ignore the
best practices from a medical point of view but, more importantly, they are likely to be unaware
of the global spread of the disease (and ignore negative externalities) and thus the urgency of
the situation. The role of leaders in this context is, therefore, crucial. Indeed, and despite
the scarcity of rigorous evidence, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that political leaders’
recommendations on preventive health behavior could be taken seriously by followers, regardless
of how scientifically based the statements are. For instance, after President Trump suggested
that disinfectant could be injected as a remedy against the Coronavirus (Vox (2020b)), several
articles reported an increase in the interest (and eventually purchasing) of disinfectant (Vox
(2020a)).
In this paper, we aim at bridging this gap in the literature by exploring the effect of a
high-profile political leader’s behavior and public speech on the citizens’ preventive and risky
behavior. We focus on the recent outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Brazil, a particularly
suitable setting to address our research question.1 Since the beginning of the pandemic, the
official response was notably heterogeneous among the different governments at the state and
federal levels. While many sub-national governments declared non-pharmaceutical interventions
with different levels of strictness (e.g. Anderson et al., 2020) and recommended adherence to
social distancing, President Bolsonaro has minimized the effect of the disease to the point of
explicitly and publicly contradicting the instructions communicated by governors. In a number
of different events (that even reached the international media — see, for instance, (e.g. FT,
2020; The Economist, 2020), Brazil’s President publicly motivated citizens to go out and thus
break the social isolation policies.
The framework is thus ideal for testing if the speech of a public leader (in this case, the
head of state) could induce certain types of behavior that might lead to perceptible risks for
individuals with potential negative externalities to communities. Brazil is a highly polarized
country in which the President has an almost equal level of strong approval and disapproval from
the citizens (e.g. Hunter and Power, 2019). We hypothesize that the President’s supporters are
significantly more prone to be persuaded by his words than his critics, even in a context of high-
stake decisions, such as adherence (or not) to preventive measures during the pandemic, which
were recommended by the World Health Organization, Brazil’s sub-national governments, and
1Brazil is a three-tiered federation with 26 states, a Federal District and 5,571 municipalities.
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also endorsed by the national Ministry of Health.2
In order to address our research question we use several datasets. We first deploy a social
distancing index at the municipal-day level constructed by In Loco (a technology company with
offices in Brazil and in the United States), based on granular location data from tens of millions
of anonymous mobile devices across Brazil. The index is defined as the proportion of mobile
phones in a given municipality that stayed within a radius of 450 meters from their habitual
home during a day. We then combine this with municipal data from the 2018 presidential
election and conduct an event-study type of analysis at the day-municipality level. In our
setting, the “intervention” is defined by the interaction of a “pro-government” dummy (based
on the average municipal support to the current President in the 2018 elections) and the dates
corresponding to the events in which the President publicly challenged the social distancing
policies.
We show that, following public and prominent speeches of the President against social
isolation policies, the average social distancing index immediately falls in those municipalities
with a majority of supporters. The effect is significant, it persists for at least a week and it is
robust to several specifications and definitions of political support. We also show insignificant
pre-event effects. Moreover, we present suggestive evidence of a larger effect being present in
municipalities with a higher presence of local media or internet penetration among households,
a result consistent with other papers that have emphasized the role of local media disseminating
political news in Brazil (see Ferraz and Finan (2008)) and, in particular, the fundamental role
of internet access Bessone et al. (2019)).3
We complement the empirical analysis with a simple theoretical model to rationalize how
differences in perceived expected loss of being infected by the virus (likely to be affected by the
presidents’ words and actions) affect equilibrium social distancing. In our model, individuals
are willing to self-isolate voluntarily when the probability of contracting the disease is tangible.
However, people also weigh the contagion risk against losses of income and the inconvenience
of living in isolation. As a consequence, voluntary social distancing can start to keep people at
home only when the infection risk becomes visible, which is unlikely in the initial stages of the
pandemic. Individuals might overexpose themselves to infection.
Our paper relates to several strands of the literature. First, it builds on the literature on
the role of leaders in shaping people’s beliefs and behavior. Although the traditional approach
of economics has focused on transactional leadership (e.g. Burns, 1978) – incentives as the main
channel through which the principal can induce behavior among the agents (see for instance
Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) or Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994))
–, there is a growing theoretical (such as Hermalin (1998) or Acemoglu and Jackson (2015))
and empirical literature studying how leaders can motivate followers to voluntarily behave in
certain ways, with their speeches and their exemplar behavior. Using Mexican data, Ajzenman
(2018), for example, shows that when a corruption scandal by a political leader is revealed,
2On 16 April 2020, Bolsonaro sacked his ministry of health after weeks of public conflicts on their different
views on social distancing policies and the effectiveness of treatments based on anti-malaria drugs to fight critical
cases of the novel coronavirus.
3In the Appendix, we also document suggestive evidence of a change in the trend of reported cases few
days after the events. As we explain in the appendix, cases’ reporting data in Brazil has serious concerns in
terms of its quality and under-reporting and it is, thus, unreliable. Although this is true for many countries,
in the case of Brazil, testing seems to be disproportionally low in comparison to other countries, even within
the same Region. Brazil, up to now, has tested people at a rate far lower than any other nation with at least
40,000 cases. For instance, Brazil has tested 12 times fewer people than Iran and thirty-two times fewer than
the United States (see The Washington Post (2020)). Moreover, testing is not uniformly distributed among
states (or municipalities) or days, and there is no reason to believe that its distribution across time or space is
unrelated to other relevant variables or events.
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citizens become more dishonest and adopt more corrupt beliefs (results consistent with those
of d’Adda et al. (2017), tested in the lab). Jack and Recalde (2015), in a field experiment in
Bolivia, find that voluntary contributions to a public good rise when an elected politician leads
by the example. In a different setting, Antonakis et al. (2014) show in field and lab experiments
that listening a charismatic speech from a leader can induce prosocial behavior among workers
(results in line with the in-the-lab findings of Ga¨chter and Renner (2018)). Two papers are
particularly related to ours: Bassi and Rasul (2017) show that the Papal’s visit to Brazil in
1991 had a significant effect on beliefs and behavior related to fertility, among those directly
exposed to his speech; while Stroebel and van Benthem (2012) show that the public approval
of the use of condoms to fight HIV by an influential Catholic archbishop in Kenya caused a
significant increase in its use among unmarried Catholics in the diocese. Our study contributes
to this literature, and complements these papers by focusing on a particularly relevant type of
leader – the head of state – and showing how his speech affects citizens’ risky health-related
behavior.
Second, and related to the effects of a leader’s speech on behavior, our paper contributes
to the general literature on persuasion. DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) present a complete
empirical review of the effect of persuasion on consumers, donors, voters, and investors. We
contribute to this literature by providing a novel piece of evidence on how political leaders
can persuade citizens to adopt a risky behavior amidst the most disruptive and widespread
pandemic of a century.
Third, our paper relates to the recent literature on the COVID-19 Pandemic and social
distancing compliance. Barrios and Hochberg (2020) document a partisan divide in compliance
with social distancing. In particular, the paper shows that pro-Trump counties are more prone
to keep social distancing, a result consistent with the findings of Allcott et al. (2020) and
Kushner Gadarian et al. (2020). In a paper closer to ours, Painter and Qiu (2020) show that
state-level “stay-at-home” orders in the US are more likely to be abided by democrats when
the governor is a democrat. In a paper very similar to ours, Grossman et al. (2020) use twitter
data from governors to show that Governors’ recommendations for residents to stay at home
preceded stay-at-home orders led to a large and significant reduction in mobility, an effect
that was larger in Democratic than Republican-leaning counties, and more pronounced under
Republican governors. Our paper contributes to this growing literature by showing how the
actions and words of the president can affect the behavior of the followers, regardless of the
legal or official policies (such as “stay-at-home” orders) put in place.
Finally, and more generally, our paper contributes to the literature on behavioral change
promotion in public health through opinion leaders. Most of the papers in this field focus on
the identification of efficient channels/agents to spread a positive change/innovation in health
behavior, such as celebrities, community leaders or peer leaders (see Valente and Pumpuang
(2007) for a comprehensive review). Kalichman and Hunter (1992), for instance, show significant
changes in HIV-related beliefs after professional NBA star “Magic” Johnson’s disclosure of his
HIV infection; La Ferrara et al. (2012) show how a popular soap opera in Brazil caused a
significant reduction in fertility, induced by the behavior of the main characters of the TV
show. In a similar paper, Kearney and Levine (2015) show that a popular MTV show (“16
and Pregnant”) reduced teen births in the US. In a context similar to ours, Bursztyn et al.
(2020) show that prevention (or anti-prevention) messages broadcasted through TV shows had
a significant impact on viewers’ behavior and downstream outcomes during the COVID-19
Pandemic in the US. We contribute to this literature by showing that the head of state can be
an effective agent of behavioral change. In our case, to promote or not a lessening in preventive
health behavior.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the context and the chronology
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of events in Brazil. Section III presents a theoretical model of social distancing compliance.
Section IV describes the data. Section V presents the empirical model and the main results
and Section VI concludes.
II Context and Chronology
The COVID-19 Pandemic has claimed many lives and is causing widespread disruption to the
world economy. Since its outbreak, most countries are reporting exponential growth in the
incidence of reported COVID-19 cases. Several countries started to actively implement non-
pharmaceutical interventions with different levels of stringency to mitigate the spread of the
virus: ranging from traveling restrictions,4 school closings, bans on public gatherings to home
isolation or even mandatory quarantines. The mitigation strategy, as it was popularized by the
Imperial College Report, aims at “flattening the curve”, in order to keep the number of critic
cases at a manageable level and thus avoid a collapse of the health system. Although some of
these rules are, by definition, abided by the citizens (for instance, school closings), the level
of compliance of many others depend on their goodwill (and, naturally, their socio-economic
status), especially in countries in which isolation is recommended but not legally enforced.
Some countries have reacted more moderately, either by deliberate choice or due to implementation
constraints (say, in places, with many slums and people living on the streets) leaving individuals
to choose for themselves an appropriate degree of self-isolation.
As we show in our theoretical framework presented in Section III, individuals are willing to
self-isolate voluntarily when the perceived expected loss of being infected is high. Individuals
weigh the risk and the loss of getting the virus against losses of income, employment and the
inconvenience of social distancing. Critics of voluntary social distancing believe that relying on
individual choice can lead to people to self-isolate only when the infection risk becomes visible,
and the epidemic has already taken off with no major effects on flattening the curve.
In Brazil, and similar to what was experienced in other countries such as the United States,
the official response to the outbreak was not clear. In addition, being a federal country where
state governments have real power to implement their own social distancing policies, the actions
in the country were spatially heterogeneous and uncoordinated. Figure I shows that every single
state ended up adopting mandated measures of social distancing policies, closing schools and
some public spaces, although the timing varied across states.
As novel coronavirus cases and fatalities started to rise in the country, the Brazilian President
Jair Bolsonaro minimized the pandemic and has not endorsed strict quarantine and social
distancing measures, some implemented by Brazilian sub-national governments. Bolsonaro
has encouraged people to go out and even make appearances in stores, markets and public
demonstrations on the streets contradicting his own health minister,5 while dismissing the
effects of the virus as “just a little dose of flu” (see The Wall Street Journal, 4/2) and calling
the disease a “media trick” (see The Guardian, 3/23). His behavior was so controversial that it
rapidly made it to dozens of international media outlets, such as The Times of India (“Brazil
president takes selfies, cheers demonstrators despite virus warnings”, 3/16), The Economist
(“BolsoNero: Brazil’s president fiddles as a pandemic looms”, 3/26), BBC (“Coronavirus:
4The Stringency Index, produced by the Oxford Blavatnik School of Government contains an
up-to-date summary of the containing measures implemented by each country. It is available at
https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/oxford-covid-19-government-response-tracker.
5On 16 April 2020, Bolsonaro fired his health minister after weeks of public confrontation on their opposing
views on governors’ policies to shut down schools and businesses and on the effectiveness of antimalarial
medications to fight the disease.
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Brazil’s Bolsonaro in denial and out on a limb”, 3/29),The New York Times (“Bolsonaro,
Isolated and Defiant, Dismisses Coronavirus Threat to Brazil”, 4/1), The Wall Street Journal
(“‘Go Back to Work’: Bolsonaro Dismisses Risks of Deadly Coronavirus in Brazil”, 4/2), and
The Washington Post (“Bolsonaro may be the world’s coronavirus skeptic in chief”, 4/7), among
many others.
Despite his opposition to drastic social distancing measures and his denial regarding the
health severity of the novel coronavirus, his messages on the issue were not always uniform and
clear. We summarize some of his speeches and public demonstrations on COVID-19 Pandemic.
We show that there were two key events in which his critiques were particularly focused on
condemning the social distancing policies and, unlike other days, made to the front pages of
the main national media outlets. The dates were March 15th and March 24th.
(i) In a neutral position regarding the severity of the pandemic, Bolsonaro first mentioned
the virus in his twitter account on 31 January 2020.
(ii) In a televised presidential statement on 6 March, Bolsonaro stated that people “must
strictly follow the experts’ recommendations as the best protective measure”. However,
there was no clear recommendation on social distancing measures.
(iii) In an official visit to the United States on 10 March 2020, Bolsonaro recognized that
there was a world crisis related to the coronavirus, but it was probably not as strong as
the mainstream media reported. On 12 March 2020, Bolsonaro appeared with his health
minister Mandetta on television, both wearing face masks, and the president monitored
by doctors, since some members of his cabinet, who also went to the United States in
the presidential mission, tested positive for COVID-19. Due to the risk of contagion,
the health minister recommended to postpone the public protests against the Congress
and the Federal Supreme Court (STF) scheduled for Sunday 15 March 2020. On an
official pronouncement on 12 March, Bolsonaro stated that these public marches should
be “reconsidered” given the “current events”.
(iv) March 15th - Demonstration: The marches on 15 March went on despite official
messages calling them off. Then, unexpectedly, Bolsonaro, still on suspicion of being
infected with COVID-19, joined one of the demonstrations in Brasilia. He took selfies
and distributed fist bumps with several supporters and during that day posted the largest
number of tweets since he became the president (47 tweets), most of them with videos
showing the rallies in different cities of the country.
His behavior rapidly captured the attention of national and international media. On the
16th, Bolsonaro’s picture in the march appeared in the front page of the three largest
newspapers in Brazil (Folha de Sao Paulo, O Globo and Estadao) with headlines directly
alluding to his behavior in relation to the prevention of the virus. Folha’s headline,
for example, stated that “Bolsonaro ignores the virus and shows up in a march against
the Congress and the STF”. Estadao’s headline pointed towards the same direction
“Infectologists criticize Bolsonaro for giving a bad example to the nation”, similar to
O Globo’s headline: “Don’t do what I do, bad examples threaten the fight against
Coronavirus” (see Figure II as an example). Other newspapers had similar headlines.
On March 16, Gazeta do Povo, a conservative newspaper in the state of Parana´ shows a
picture of Bolsonaro taking selfies in one of the rallies.
(v) On 18 March 2020, Bolsonaro and several of his ministers, all wearing face masks, spoke
with the press and presented policies to mitigate the economic and health impacts of the
pandemic. There was no clear message on social distancing.
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(vi) March 24th - Official Presidential Pronouncement: Since the beginning of the
outbreak, until April 14th, there were five official presidential pronouncements. This
type of pronouncement is particularly relevant because every TV or radio station in the
country broadcast official pronouncements. Broadcasting is mandatory and, thus, these
types of messages are scarce and reserved for especially relevant communications from
the president (in 2019, for instance, there were five official pronouncements throughout
the entire year).6 In the first two communications (March 6th and 12th), the president
gave short speeches and the messages were not very specific on social distancing. He
emphasized the work of the federal government and tried to bring calm and encouraged
people to follow the prevention measures recommended by the specialists. The tone of
these messages were completely reverted in the speech of March 24th.
Doubling the length of his discourse, in this one Bolsonaro directly referred to the social
distancing policies implemented by the sub-national governments. He first emphasized
that the risk group was mainly the elderly and, thus, suggested there was no point in
closing schools. He also emphasized that jobs had to be maintained and criticized the
media for spreading the news of Italy (“a country with a large elderly population and
completely different weather”).
He referred to his personal situation and said that, because of his athletic historical
condition, he would not need to worry even if he got infected: “I would feel nothing or,
in the worst case, it would be like a little flu.”
He finally mentioned the effectiveness of antimalarial medications based on hydroxychloroquine
(HCQ) in fighting the disease caused by COVID-19.
As in the case of the public protests on 15 March (and unlike any of the previous or
posterior official communications), his speech made it again to the front pages of the
main national newspapers the following day. Folha’s headline, for example, stated that
“Bolsonaro criticizes school closures and attacks the press”. Estadao’s headline stated
that “Bolsonaro criticizes the quarantine and wants stores and schools to open”, similar
to O Globo’s headline: “Bolsonaro ignores the world’s trends and criticizes isolation and
school closures” (see Figure III as an example).
(vii) The next official pronouncement was on March 31st and Bolsonaro toned down his speech.
Citing the World Health Organization he highlighted the need of saving jobs as much as
possible “If we prevent people from moving, what would happen to those who have to
work in order to get their daily bread?” He praised the policies implemented by the
federal government to mitigate the effects of the epidemic together with sub-national
governments but was clear to state that the side effects of the measures should not be
worse than the disease.
(viii) Finally, on April’s 8th official pronouncement, Bolsonaro kept the tone of the previous
one, praising his policies, the coordination of the federal government with the states, but
continued emphasizing the need to keep jobs and the effectiveness of HCQ in treating
patients with COVID-19. If any, media’s interpretation was that Bolsonaro’s was toning
down his message (Folha, for example stated on April 1st that “Bolsonaro changes his
tone, and speaks about a pact and a challenge for this generation”,7 while O Globo stated
that “Cases in the country hit a record, and Bolsonaro, isolated, moderates his tone”8).9
6The text of each of these speeches can be accessed publicly in this website: https://www.gov.br/planalto/
pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/pronunciamentos.
7See https://www.vercapas.com.br/edicao/capa/folha-de-s-paulo/2020-04-01/
8See https://www.vercapas.com.br/edicao/capa/o-globo/2020-04-0
9Each of the main newspapers’ front pages can be downloaded from https://vercapas.com.br.
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Therefore, two events were very strong and outliers in spreading a message against social
distancing. The first is his personal demonstration on 15 March by joining the crowd with a
non-negligible risk of being infected and breaking public health guidelines to avoid contagion.
The second event is his official pronouncement on 24 March in which he pushed to end social
distancing measures implemented by some sub-national governments. Since 24 March there
were public demonstrations of Bolsonaro against measures of social distancing.
III Theoretical Model
In this section, we present a simple model to understand how differences in perceived expected
loss of being infected by the virus affect equilibrium social distancing and the dynamics of
infection. This is a stylized model which is used only for qualitative and positive analysis. We do
not implement any normative or quantitative analysis.10 The background of the environment is
the basic SIR (Susceptible (S), Infected (I) and Recovered(R)) model presented by Kermack and
McKendrick (1927). Here, we briefly describe this model and then extend it to an environment
with heterogeneous agents and equilibrium social distancing.11
Time is continuous and the population size is normalized to one such that St + It + Rt =
N = 1. At the initial period the number of recovered or deceased (or immune) individuals is
R0 = 0 and a small measure of individuals gets infected such that S0 is just below 1 and I0 is
just above zero. At each instant, individuals match randomly. Susceptible individuals St might
be contaminated at rate β once they match with infected individuals It. Infected individuals
recover from the disease at rate γ and then become immune to the disease. The dynamics of
infection is described by the following system of differential equations
S˙t = −βItSt, (1)
I˙t = βItSt − γIt, (2)
R˙t = γIt. (3)
During the epidemic, the measure of infected individuals initially rises and peaks at S = γ
β
and it then decreases. In the literature, the ratio r = β
γ
is defined as the basic reproduction
number. It is the average number of people infected from one other person. The solid line of
Figure IV(a) illustrates the dynamics of the SIR model.
A lockdown can be thought as a reduction on β, the passage rate and it flattens the infection
curve out. This typical model can be extended in many dimensions. One of them is to introduce
congestion in hospitals.12 Since the measure of fatalities relative to total infection is, for most of
10See Greenwood et al. (2019) for a quantitative model of HIV/AIDS epidemic and Toxvaerd (2019) for an
analysis of optimal policy in an epidemic model with costly preventive behavior.
11For models with equilibrium social distancing see Toxvaerd (2020). Based on Keppo et al. (2020), we
introduce heterogeneity in the perceived expected loss of being infected.
12For instance, let Ct denote sick individuals in critical state. A typical equation describing the dynamics of
individuals in the critical state is
C˙t = γχIt − λCt.
The number of fatalities is given by:
D˙t = λCt
(
1−
(
(1− δ) + θ1
(1 + Ct)θ2
))
.
The change in the number of fatalities has two terms. The first one corresponds to the fact that some people
would naturally die from the disease. The second component depends on the amount of people being treated (a
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the epidemic, small, then the dynamics for the susceptible, infected and recovered individuals
are similar to those reported in Figure IV and therefore we will abstract from deaths here and
explore the equilibrium social distancing dimension.
Now, let’s still assume that there is a continuum of individuals of measure one, but consider
the case in which there are n ∈ {1, 2..., N} types of individuals. The share of type-n agents
is pin ∈ [0, 1] with
∑N
i=1 pin = 1 and their expected perceived loss of being infected is Ln > 0.
Without loss of generality assume we let 0 ≤ L1 < L2 < ... < LN .13 Agents can take actions
to avoid contagion by being vigilant. The social distancing effort of an agent n is vn and this
decreases the infection rate, as it will be described below. This can be thought of avoiding going
out or visiting relatives, working from home, using masks, more hand washing and cleaning,
self isolation and so on. The social distancing effort vn to avoid infection comes with a cost
described by the function c(vn) =
v2n
2
. This can be interpreted as the foregone income of working
from home, employment loss and non-monetary stress and mental illness of being deprived of
a social life.
As previously, at each instant, the population matches randomly and susceptible individuals
St might be contaminated once they match with infected individuals It. The rate at which
infection is transferred to an individual n is
βf(vn)
[
N∑
i=1
pinf(v¯n)
]
with f(vn) = 1− ζvn,
where ζ > 0 is a parameter describing the effectiveness of how individual’s own vigilance avoids
infection and v¯n is the social distancing taken by the other agents. Clearly, if vn is equal to
zero for all n, then the infection rate is β. Therefore, the aggregate rate at which a susceptible
individual becomes infected is given by
xt(vn/v¯) = βf(vn)
[
N∑
i=1
pinf(v¯n)
]
StIt.
Given other players’ strategy v¯, an individual chooses social distancing vnt to minimize the
perceived expected total loss, such that:
v∗nt = arg min
vn≥0
{
xt(vn/v¯)Ln +
v2n
2
}
.
In a Nash equilibrium of this contagion game, it can be shown that
v∗nt =
ζβItStLn
1 + ζ2βItSn[
∑N
i=1 piiLi]
> 0 and f(v∗n,t) = (1− ζv∗n,t) ∈ (0, 1). (4)
Therefore, the lower agent-n perceived expected loss Ln, then the less caution of getting the
virus the agent is and the lower is her vigilance. In addition, the lower is the perceived expected
loss of the other agents, L¯ =
∑N
i=1 piiLi, the higher is her vigilance. Clearly, social distancing
congestion problem). The higher the number of individuals in the intensity unit, the higher will be the number
of fatalities due to a problem of a congestion in hospitals.
13We live in households and maybe, for an epidemic, household heterogeneity is more important than
individual heterogeneity. Therefore, we could interpret Ln as the perceived loss of household type-n.
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rises with contagion βItSt. The dynamics of the system is given by:
S˙t = −β
[
N∑
i=1
pii(1− ζv∗it)
][
N∑
i=1
pii(1− ζv∗it)
]
StIt, (5)
I˙t = β
[
N∑
i=1
pii(1− ζv∗it)
][
N∑
i=1
pii(1− ζv∗it)
]
StIt − γIt, (6)
R˙t = γIt. (7)
Figure IV(a) shows the dynamics (solid line) of a typical epidemiological model without endogenous
social distancing and the dynamics of a model with equilibrium social distancing (dotted line).
As the number of infected people increases and contagion rises, then individuals become
more vigilant, equilibrium social distancing rises and therefore the number of infected people
is reduced relative to the typical epidemiological model. As we can see, equilibrium vigilance
flattens the infection curve out but quantitative it can be very different from a change in β.
Individuals are willing to self-isolate quantitatively when the probability of contracting the
disease is tangible. However, people also weigh the contagion risk against losses of income and
the inconvenience of living in isolation. As a consequence, voluntary social distancing can start
to keep people at home only when the infection risk becomes visible, and the epidemic has
already taken off. This can be very different from a policy that enforces a lockdown.
Figure IV(b) shows the equilibrium vigilance for 3 different individuals (agent with highest
(v∗N,t), median (v
∗
m,t) and lowest (v
∗
2,t) perceived expected loss) who are heterogeneous in their
perceived expected loss of infection. The highest curve is associated with the individual with
the highest perceived expected loss of infection.
What are the effects on the infection rate of a rise in the share of individuals who perceive
the infection to be a minor health problem (or the lowest value of Ln)? There are two opposing
effects. The first effect is a composition effect since there will be more individuals with the
lowest equilibrium vigilance, i.e. with v∗1t, and therefore the infection rate should rise. But the
average perceived expected loss
∑N
i piiLl in society falls and vigilance and alertness to avoid
infection of all agents rise, which decrease the infection rate. With two types of individuals,
the following proposition shows that the former effect dominates the second and a rise in the
share of individuals with the lowest perceived loss of infection increases the infection rate.
Proposition 1. Assume that there are two types of individuals n ∈ {1, 2} with {L1 < L2} and
the share of type-1 individuals is pi. Denote the society’s infection rate by βt where
βt = β
[
pi(1− ζv∗1,t) + (1− pi)(1− ζv∗2,t)
]2
, with v∗n,t =
ζβItStLn
1 + ζ2βItSn[piL1 + (1− pi)L2] .
Then a rise in pi increases the society’s infection rate βt; and a fall in L1 and/or in L2 increases
the society infection rate βt
Proof. Taking derivatives of βt with respect to pi yields:
∂βt
∂pi
= 2β
[
pi(1− ζv∗1,t) + (1− pi)(1− ζv∗2,t)
]
ζ(v∗2,t − v∗1,t)(1− ζ(piv∗1,t + (1− pi)v∗2,t)) > 0.
Similarly, taking derivatives of βt with respect to L1 and L2 imply that
∂βt
∂L1
< 0 and ∂βt
∂L2
< 0,
as required.
10
Figure V shows that as the share of individuals with lower perceived expected loss increases
then the infection curve becomes steeper with a higher peak. If fatalities are positively related
to the peak of the curve due to congestion of critical patients in hospitals, then a rise in the
share of individuals with lower perceived loss would lead to a rise in fatalities from the epidemic.
A similar effect can be found if, for some individuals in society, the perceived expected loss from
the disease falls.
IV Data
Our unit of analysis is the municipality. We use four sources of data to conduct our empirical
analysis. In order to measure social distancing, we use an index created and developed by In
Loco (https://inloco.com.br/), a Brazilian technology company that provides intelligence
based on mobile location data. In Loco collects anonymized14 location data from 60 million
devices, enabling mobile apps to provide location-aware services while securing the privacy of
their users. Using Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and GPS, In Loco can track the most likely devices’
locations across the country and their movement when mobile apps are used in different
locations during a day, with a precision of three meters.15
The social distancing index measures the percentage of devices in a given municipality,
which remained within a radius of 450 meters of the location identified as home. The index is
computed on a daily basis, and goes from zero to one. Figure VI shows the evolution of this
daily social distancing index for the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro from 1 February to
14 April 2020 (the entire period of time for which we got access to the data). As we can see,
social distancing in both sates started to rise once the states introduced non-pharmaceutical
interventions, such as school and non-essential store closure. Figure VII shows the map of
Brazil and the social distancing index for all municipalities on Tuesday, 4 February 2020, and
on Tuesday, 7 April 2020. Therefore, the aggregate evidence shows that social distancing has
risen nationally, but the changes were not homogeneous, with some municipalities increasing
more social distancing than others. The mean of the social distancing index for the total period
is 0.37 (0.25 in February, 0.41 in March and 0.53 from the 1st to the 14th of April).
To measure support for the President, we use electoral data provided by the Superior
Electoral Court (TSE — “Tribunal Superior Eleitoral”). We collect data on vote counts of
the 2018 Presidential Election in Brazil aggregated at the municipality level to match the
geographical unit of our social distancing outcome. Since these data contain vote totals for each
candidate by municipality, we use several vote-related measures as a proxy for the President’s
local support.
The Population Census of 2010 collected by the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics (IBGE)
provides data on population size, income, poverty and consumption of durable goods (such as
TVs and computers) at the municipal level. We also collect data from IBGE’s MUNIC (“Perfil
dos Municipios Brasileiros”) in 2018 related to local-level media presence, such as the presence
of local TV broadcasters.
14No name, social security number or mobile number are provided.
15See Peixoto et al. (2020) for a complete description of how the data is collected and computed.
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V Empirical Model and Main Results
In order to identify the causal effect of Bolsonaro’s public demonstrations and speech against
social distancing on behavior, we estimate a two-way fixed effects model (day, municipality),
with leads and lags, in order to test pre-trends (placebo) and post-trend (dynamic effects). In
particular, we estimate the following empirical model:
SocialDistancingmd =
+10∑
l=−10
αlTreatedmd−l + αTreatedmd + φd + ρm + λXmd + δZsd + smd,
where SocialDistancingmd is the social distancing index for the municipality m, in day d; and
Treatedmd is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if two conditions are fulfilled: the municipality
m is defined as “pro-government” (voting for Bolsonaro was above 50% in the first round of
the 2018 election) and the day d corresponds to one of the two events that we defined: March
16th and March 25th (it takes a value of zero, otherwise). We define t=0 (treatment) the first
day after the march that took place on the afternoon of the 15th and the first day after the
official speech pronounced by Bolsonaro at night on the 24th. These are also the dates in which
the news reached the front pages of the main Brazilian newspapers. We include ten leads and
ten lags of this variable to detect pre-treatment and post-treatment effects. ρm and φd are
municipality and day fixed effects, respectively.16
We control for a number of relevant time-varying characteristics at the municipality-day
and state-day levels. First, we control for a series of dummies indicating the type of non-
pharmaceutical intervention in place in a given state (s) and day (d). These dummies (Zsd)
cover three categories: a school ban only, a school ban plus a general ban for non-essential
activities or no ban at all. Also, to account for the fact that the support for the government
is strongly correlated with variables such as poverty and condition of rurality (both time-
invariant), we control for the interaction between day fixed effects and a poverty dummy at
the municipality level, and fixed effect and a rurality dummy at the same level (Zmd).
17 In our
main specification we also include a state-specific linear trend. To account for the plausible
temporal correlation of policies within states, we cluster the standard errors at the state-day
level and we weight the municipal observations by their population in 2019.
The results of our baseline model are presented in Figure VIII. As expected, all except one
leads (t = -9) are indistinguishable from zero. On the contrary, every single starting on day
1 is negative, and all of them starting from day 2 are significantly different from zero. As a
robustness check, we estimate the same model but changing the definition of “pro-government”
support. As the two graphs in Figure IX show, there is a clear regional divide in the support
for Bolsonaro. When classifying municipalities were Bolsonaro obtained more than 50% of the
votes in the first round of the 2018 presidential election as “pro-government”, we are losing
within state variability in our treatment variable in around 14% of the observations, as there
were some states where every single municipality were either anti-Bolsonaro or pro-Bolsonaro.
Because most of the social distancing policies were implemented at the state level, having within
state variability is important for our empirical analysis.
To address this potential problem, we estimate the same model, but we alternatively define
that a municipality is “pro-Bolsonaro” if the votes for Bolsonaro in the first round were
above the median observed in the state. In Figure X we show that the results, if any, are
16Our model, which includes multiple events in close succession, follows the standard specification in the
literature. See Sandler and Sandler (2014) for a detailed description.
17The poverty dummy equals one if the municipal poverty rate is above the national-level median. The rurality
dummy equals one if the proportion of residents living in rural areas is above the national-level median.)
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more pronounced. A concern with this specification could be that, in those extremely “anti-
Bolsonaro” states (e.g. the median vote for Bolsonaro in the first round was around 15%), a
municipality would be considered as a “pro-Bolsonaro” unit, when the support for the President
is actually very low. To account for this problem, we re-estimate the baseline equation, but
now restricting the municipalities to the states in which there were at least a third of the
municipalities where Bolsonaro obtained more than 50%. We then define a “pro-government”
municipality as those where the president obtained more than the state median within the
restricted sample. This model could be thus interpreted as the effect of the treatment within
the most pro-Bolsonaro states. The results are presented in Figure XI. Again, if any, the effect
seems to be more pronounced. The magnitude of the effect seems to be large, close to 2pp, on
average (compared to a mean of around 0.37 for the entire period).
In order to provide some suggestive evidence on the mechanisms underlying our results, we
explore the potential role of the local media presence in each municipality. Although we cannot
present conclusive results, Figures XII, XIII and XIV document some interesting patterns. In
Figure XII we estimate the baseline model for two sub-samples: municipalities where there is
no presence of local TV broadcasters (left) and those where there is at least one (right). In
Figure XIII, we run a similar regression but now dividing the sample into groups according
to the households’ average internet penetration per municipality. A municipality is defined as
having “low internet penetration” (left) if it is below the top 25% of the distribution of this
variable according to the census, or “high internet penetration” (right), otherwise. Finally, in
XIV we show the results of estimating the same model but now combining the definitions of
the previous two. A municipality is defined as having “low media penetration” (left) if it is
below the top 25% of the distribution of this variable according to the census and there is no
local TV broadcaster in the municipality, or “high media penetration” (right), otherwise. In
all three graphs a pattern emerges: the effects seems to be driven by those municipalities with
higher level of media penetration. 1819
VI Conclusion
Studying the effects of leadership is particularly relevant during a crisis, such as a pandemic,
as leaders’ behavior and attitudes can have a significant impact on individual health and the
health-care systems. Information on recommended prevention practices is typically asymmetrical
between governments and citizens, and the problem becomes even more stringent during a
public health emergency. Citizens may ignore the best practices from a medical point of
view but, more importantly, they are likely to be unaware of the global spread of the disease
(and ignore negative externalities) since their perceived expected loss of getting the virus are
heterogeneous. The role of leaders in this context is, therefore, crucial.
In this paper we focused on Brazil during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Brazil is a politically
polarized country in which President Bolsonaro has been actively and publicly spreading
an anti-isolation message, thus encouraging people to challenge the regulations imposed by
the sub-national governments, the advises of the World Health Organization and even the
recommendations of his minister of health (finally dismissed). Brazil is a federal country and
18Data on internet penetration was obtained from the last Census (2010). Data on local media presence at
the municipality level was obtained from the “Perfil dos Munic´ıpios Brasileiros” in 2018.
19An expected consequence of breaking isolation is the number of cases should grow. Analyzing this pattern
with the current data is hard, as it suffers from serious problems in terms of quality and under-reporting. In the
Appendix we explain in detail the problems with the data and, with this caveat, we show suggestive evidence
of a change in the trend of the reported cases around 4 days after the events.
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the institutional reaction of each state and the federal government was notably heterogeneous.
Thus, the setting is particularly suitable to explore the effect of high-profile political leaders’
words and actions on the behavior of his followers, beyond the legal enforcement of the official
social distancing measures.
To address our research question, we deploy a social distancing index at the municipal-day
level constructed by In Loco (a technology company with offices in Brazil and the United States),
based on granular location data from tens of millions of anonymous mobile devices across
Brazil. We found a strong persuasion effect of Bolsonaro on the behavior of his supporters. In
particular, we document a significant decrease in social distancing following the most visible
events of the President against self-isolation behavior and policies in pro-Bolsonaro municipalities.
We also present suggestive evidence of the message being more effective among those municipalities
with a higher presence of local media and internet penetration.
Our empirical results emphasize the behavioral change among citizens induced by political
leaders’ examples — and not only through the design of incentives, regulations and institutions,
but also through persuasion, motivation and leadership.
The article is still a work-in-progress, and we plan to update our estimates with new waves
of data points and investigate the effects of individual behavior on outcomes related to public
health (such as hospital congestion).
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VII Figures
Figure I. NPI Policies implemented by each Brazilian state
Note: The figure shows non-pharmaceutical policies (school closure and stores closure) implemented by all Brazilian states
between March 11th and March 27th.
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Figure II. Media on March 16th
Note: Cover of the newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo - Monday, March 16th of 2020
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Figure III. Media on March 25th
Note: Cover of the newspaper Estado de Sao Paulo - Tuesday, March 25th of 2020
20
Figure IV. SIR model with social distancing.
(a) Dynamics of the SIR model without (solid) and with (dashed) social
distancing.
(b) Social distancing by different agents who are heterogeneous in their
perceived expected loss.
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Figure V. SIR model with social distancing and with an increase in the share of individuals
who believe the infection has minor health effects.
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Figure VI. Evolution of Social Distancing in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
(a) Sao Paulo.
(b) Rio de Janeiro.
Notes. The figures show the daily social distancing index for the state of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro from 1
February to 14 April 2014. The social distancing index is calculated by the technology company In Loco using
location data from mobile devices.
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Figure VII. Social Distancing Index: Before and After
(a) Social Distancing Before: Feb 4 (b) Social Distancing After: Apr 7
Notes. The figures show the social distancing index for all municipalities in Brazil on 4 February and 7 April
2020. Municipalities in white are those without data on social distancing. The social distancing index is
calculated by the technology company In Loco using location data from mobile devices.
Figure VIII. Average Effect on Social Distancing
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Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1
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Figure IX. Voting 2018 Election
(a) 1st
(b) 2nd
Note: The figures show the association between social distancing and votes in the 2018 election.
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Figure X. Average Effect on Social Distancing - Support for Bolsonaro: above state median
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Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1
Figure XI. Average Effect on Social Distancing - Support for Bolsonaro: above state median
in Pro-Bolsonaro states
-4
0
4
Ef
fe
ct
-10 -5 0 5 10
Time
Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1
Figure XII. Average Effect on Social Distancing - By presence of local TV broadcaster
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(b) At least one local TV broadcaster in the
municipality
Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1
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Figure XIII. Average Effect on Social Distancing - By household’s internet penetration
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(b) Above p75 of Internet penetration
Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1. Internet data comes from the
2010 Census. Internet penetration is defined as the proportion of households with internet at home in the municipality
Figure XIV. Average Effect on Social Distancing - By household’s internet penetration and
local TV broadcaster
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(b) Above p75 of Internet penetration OR at least one
local TV broadcaster
Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1. Internet data comes from the
2010 Census. Internet penetration is defined as the proportion of households with internet at home in the municipality
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VIII Appendix
Analyzing the effect of Bolsonaro’s speeches and actions on reported cases is difficult with the
current data, because of least two potential problems. Firstly, the number of cases is suspected
to be heavily under-reported. The official number of cases - provided by the Ministry of
Health - depends on testing and, besides, testing capacity is not uniformly distributed across
municipalities. Moreover, there is no reason to believe its distribution in time or space is
uncorrelated to other relevant variables for our analysis. Although this is true for many
countries, in the case of Brazil, testing seems to be disproportionally low in comparison to
other countries, even within the same Region. Brazil, up to now, has tested people at a rate far
lower than any other nation with at least 40,000 cases. For instance, Brazil has tested 12 times
fewer people than Iran and thirty-two times fewer than the United States (see The Washington
Post (2020)). In the worst case, the estimation would be biased and, in the best case, the
variable has a large measurement error.
Secondly, the distribution of the number of cases is heavily skewed, as the large majority
of the municipalities have not had any recorded case so far (around 80% have zero cases until
April 14th; around 90% with only one case. Overall, 95% of the observations in our dataset
have zero cases).
With this caveat in mind, we estimate our baseline model using the log of the number of
cases as the outcome.20 We show the estimations using the three models presented above. In
Figure XV we show the result using our baseline model (defining that a municipality is “pro-
government” when voting for Bolsonaro was above 50% in the first round of the 2018 election).
Figure XVI shows the result using the alternative definitions of support: above the state-median
voting for Bolsonaro (left) and above the state-median voting for Bolsonaro, restricted to states
in which Bolsonaro won at least 50% of the municipalities (right).
In every model point estimates seem to grow around 3/4 days after our baseline. Although
the point estimates seem to suggest an effect, overall, the estimations are very imprecise (as
expected, given how noisy the outcome is).
20In this specification, without population weights, given that the outcome is not a municipal average.
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Figure XV. Average Effect on Confirmed Cases
-4
0
4
Ef
fe
ct
-10 -5 0 5 10
Time
Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1
Figure XVI. Average Effect on Confirmed Cases - Support for Bolsonaro: above state median
in Pro-Bolsonaro states
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(a) Support for Bolsonaro: above state median
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(b) Support for Bolsonaro: above state median in Pro-
Bolsonaro states
Note: CI: 90%. Standard Errors clustered at state day level. Estimations normalized to 0 at t=-1
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